THE PRESIDENCY
"Everything's Lovely"
(TIME, April 28, 1947) -- What was the President going to do about the
phone strike? Would he veto a tough labor bill? What about prices? What about
Henry Wallace? While the questions went unanswered, insouciant Harry Truman
ducked his regular press conference and had a week of fun.
He got off to a good start by buying the first poppy of the Veterans of
Foreign Wars' 1947 sale from six-year-old Saundra Fay Hall, gave her in return a
little silver sombrero he had picked up in Mexico. Later that afternoon he drove
over to the Bethesda Naval Hospital to pin a Medal of Merit with Oak Leaf
Cluster on ailing, aging former secretary of State Cordell Hull.
He found time for everyone. Round-the-world Flyer Milton Reynolds and crew
came by to receive the President's congratulations and give him a Reynolds
ball-point pen. Democratic bigwigs dropped in to talk politics. Said Jersey
City's Boss Frank Hague: "Everything's fine -- everything's lovely."
At week's end, the President drove through cheering crowds to throw out the
first ball at the postponed Senators-Yankees baseball opener. To the
consternation of newsmen who had billed him as a southpaw, Harry Truman first
tossed out a blooper with his right arm, obligingly threw another with his left
for the cameramen. Then he settled back to sip a Coke in the bright spring
sunlight, unexpectedly popped up half an inning early for the traditional
seventh inning stretch. Final score: Yankees, 7; Senators, 0.
This week the President turned to graver matters. Everything was still
lovely, but for that troublesome cloud shadow on the spring landscape -- high
prices and the danger of a recession. Speaking at the annual luncheon of the
Associated Press in Manhattan's Waldorf-Astoria hotel, Harry Truman ringingly
reiterated his familiar formula for avoiding depression: "Prices must be brought
down." (Before leaving the capital, the President had a new vaccination as a
precaution against Manhattan's smallpox scare.)
He said little that he had not said before. He quoted figures: house
furnishings were up 23% above 1945; clothing up 24%; food up 31%; wholesale
prices were even higher all along the line. Once prices were lowered, he
expected labor to do its part by following his "counsel of moderation," farmers
to keep production high. Government could help best, he said, by keeping taxes
up, reducing the debt, holding fast to rent, export and credit controls.
Said the President: "Only if we maintain and increase our prosperity can we
expect other countries to recognize the full merits of a free economy . . . the
responsibility of preserving our free enterprise system will continue to rest
upon the joint efforts of business, labor, the farmers and government."
THE CONGRESS Challenge
The American people had had enough, and the House knew it. Labor's spring
strike fever had given the nation a new fit of chills. The Hose, even more
constituent-conscious than labor-shy, reacted with a stunning strike-curb bill,
then clinched its purpose by passing the measure by a stunning majority -- 308
to 107 -- plenty of votes to override a presidential veto. With the 215
Republicans, 93 Democrats broke ranks to vote for the bill.
The 66-page measure struck in three directions: at the national Labor
Relations (Wagner) Act, at the Norris-LaGuardia (anti-injunction) Act, at
Communist influence in trade unions. Its chief points were long, strong and
sharp. They were nailed down by stern rules and broad new definitions. The only
kind of "compulsory unionism" the bill permitted was the union shop, and then
only if a majority of the workers wanted it and the employer himself had no
objection. (Closed shop: only union members may be hired. Union shop: workers
must join the union after they are hired.) The bill would safeguard both
workers' and employers' rights to speak out against unions. It would deprive
workers of the right to strike over anything but questions of wages, hours, work
requirements and work conditions; strikes over any question of union security
would be unfair labor practices. These rules drastically revised the so-called
"Magna Charta of Labor"-the Wagner Act. By giving employers the right to ask for
court injunctions when confronted by an "unlawful strike," the bill drastically
revised the Norris-La Guardia Act. It attacked Communist union influence by
barring not only Communists, but even ex-Communists and party-liners, from
holding union office.
Against Tyranny. The House's avowed aim was to bring an end to "widespread
industrial strife." That had also been the avowed aim of Congress in 1935, when
it passed the Wagner Act. But the 80th Congress now thought that the hard facts
of industrial strife had demonstrated the fallacy in congressional thinking
twelve years ago. From an annual average of 753 strikes involving 297,000
workers in 1946. Annual average of man-days lost before NRA: 10,828,000. In
1946: 116,000,000.
Numerous people had numerous explanations, aside from the Wagner Act, for
this staggering and sometimes frightening phenomenon. One of the reasons was the
increase in employment. But the House was certain that it had put its
disciplinary finger on the basic reason. The reason was not the U.S. worker --
"deprived," as the labor committee said, "of his dignity as an individual . . .
cajoled, coerced, intimidated and on many occasions beaten up. . . . The
employer's plight has likewise not been happy." The committee blamed the unions,
which the Wagner Act had made into a "tyranny more despotic than one could think
possible in a free country." Congressmen were resolved to trim down that
tyranny. A minority of committeemen protested that the bill would "result in
bitter and costly strikes."
Balance of Power. The bill had some holes in it; some of the ground rules
were vaguely defined. But essentially it accomplished what Labor Chairman Fred
Hartley jr. and his committeemen wanted. It would restore the balance of power
in labor dealings to management, which, in the apparent opinion of a majority of
U.S. Congressmen, is where it belongs in a system of free enterprise.
Organized labor wailed in agony. William Green had declared: "Hartley will be
classified as one of labor's chief enemies." C.I.O. spokesmen called the measure
"a poisonous witches' brew." Old New Dealers in Congress echoed them.
The bill was still a long way from being law. On the other side of Congress,
Senator Robert Taft's almost equally tough labor proposition had been flattened
into a pancake by his own committee. The Senate would be more cautious in its
labor legislation; in fact, some members of the House voted as they did because
they felt secure in that belief. But the House's impressive vote also
strengthened Taft, who now might be able to restore much of his bill. But
whatever happened -- a compromise between the two houses, a possible
presidential veto even of the compromise -- the House action had thrown down a
challenge to the industrial U.S.
LABOR New Mood
The mood of the nation and the House was reflected in the mood of labor. It
registered with seismographic sensitivity in Pittsburgh, where the C.I.O.'s Big
Three had gathered.
The United Electrical Workers' Jim Matles arrived, brandishing a contract
from Westinghouse, with the same $.15 raise U.E. had gotten from General Motors
five days before. Walter Reuther arrived, with a similar offer from G.M., but
still holding out for $.23 1/2.
It all depended on Phil Murray's steelworkers. They had been tied up in
negotiations since January, had extended the deadline once -- until April 30.
Now time was running out. Both Murray and Reuther were obviously piqued that
management had stolen their thunder by dealing first with the Red-wired
electrical workers. But the Big Three meeting broke up with no word of results.
Walter Reuther went back to Detroit, still breathing intransigence.
Phil Murray was conferring feverishly. There was a closed- doors conference
with U.S. Steel Vice President John A. Stephens, an all night session with
Stephens and other U.S. Steel negotiators. Rumors of a settlement drifted out at
the same time that "No Contract, No Work" stickers appeared on steelworkers'
cars.
Then Phil Murray made his announcement. Steel had settled for slightly more
than $.15. Murray had given up his demands for a union shop and the annual wage,
had promised not to press his portal-to-portal pay suits; U.S. Steel "hoped" to
hold the price line.
With the announcement, the whole labor picture changed. G.M. promptly signed
with 3,000 rubber workers in Dayton at the magical new $.15 figure. At the
least, it meant that Walter Reuther would be hard put to it to avoid accepting
about the same terms at G.M., at Chrysler, and at Ford. At most it meant that
the U.S. could look forward to a season of real labor peace.
Signs of Peace. There were already other signs that peace was at hand. In
Manhattan last week, 50,000 Western Union employees tore up their $.25 demands,
accepted a $.05 "down- payment" raise. The oldest dispute in the nation was
finally settled: on the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad, which had suffered
more than five years of wrangling, Government seizure and bloodshed, culminating
in the murder of President George McNear Jr.
The one visible road block was the telephone strike. Even that strike seemed
to be crumbling around the edges. A.T. & T. claimed it was handling four-fifths
of the normal number of local calls, that long-distance service was up to 35%.
Telephone workers were beginning to straggle back in many places: twelve in
Kosciusko, Miss; 1,500 Commercial Telephone Workers Union members in New Jersey,
pending arbitration and a constitutional test of the state's drastic new
anti-strike law; so many in the South that Southern Bell had removed emergency
restrictions from long- distance calls.
The N.F.T.W., which had started, without sufficient strength, money or
appreciation of the company's ability to keep the phones going, was desperately
sending up trial balloons. It would be glad to take a $6-a-week wage boost and
arbitrate everything else. Picket-line tension grew. In Detroit two strikers
were injured and 22 arrested after a battle with police and nonstrikers
reporting for work. In Milwaukee, one fun-loving picket paraded tauntingly in a
baby buggy as a miserly "Ma Bell".
At week's end, somewhat heartened by financial aid from the C.I.O. and A.F.
L., N.F.T.W. President Joseph Beirne appealed to the White House for settlement
help. He admitted to newsmen: "If we don't settle by Monday, our people will
still be out on strike, but some of them may want to go back to work."
A.T. & T. was still holding tight. But equipment was suffering from lack of
maintenance. As much as anything, it had been waiting to see which way steel
would jump. Now it had its cue.
Loyalties
For telephone workers of Woodward, Okla., the phone strike ended the moment
they could dig out from the debris of last fortnight's tornado. While union
officials ordered workers to ignore the emergency and stay on strike, 30 union
operators rushed back to their jobs. Last week they made the strike's end
official, sent in their resignations with a blistering telegram: "Girls refuse
to stop. Will work as long as needed. . . . Would be ashamed of a union which
would put up pickets in a disaster like this."
THE HOUSE LABOR BILL
(Major points)
- 1. Abolishes the National Labor Relations Board, substitutes a
Labor-Management Relations Board.
- 2. Bans industry-wide bargaining.
- 3. Bans the closed shop.
- 4. Bans jurisdictional and sympathy strikes.
- 5. Bans mass picketing.
- 6 Bans all strikes by Government workers.
- 7. Bars Communist union officers.
- 8 Deprives violating unions of their bargaining rights for one year.
- 9. Deprives unlawful strikers of their right to get their jobs back.
- 10. Makes unions suable.
- 11. Requires unions to make financial reports.
- 12. Empowers the President of the U.S. to obtain injunctions against
interstate transport, communications or public-utilities strikes.
June 30, 1947 LABOR The New Law
The Taft-Hartley Act-officially the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 --
is the first fundamental change in labor-relations ground rules in nearly twelve
years. By expert analysis, these are some of the things it will do or not
do:
It will not halt strikes. The emergency procedure will only affect nationwide
strikes that threaten the national safety.
But the new law should curb such strikes. Union leaders will not be able
summarily to call workers out, since the workers must first vote by secret
ballot on whether to accept the employer's final offer.
Since unions will be liable to suit for contract violation, wildcat strikes
will become unpopular. Jurisdictional strikes and boycotts will be sharply
curtailed by the NLRB's authority to get injunctions.
Employers will be able to speak freely to their employees on labor policies,
demand elections if they think the union no longer represents the majority of
their workers. Unions will be required to act responsibly, will be held more
closely to their contracts.
The power of union leaders to discriminate against individuals will be
curbed. Unions will be prevented from arbitrarily excluding men from jobs;
employers will have greater freedom in hiring & firing as a result of the
outlawing of closed shops. Union shops will still be legal.
Established unions will have some troubles. The new voting rules, by giving
craft and professional workers the right to separate organizations, may tend to
break up some C.I.O.-type industry-wide unions into smaller craft unions like
A.F.L.'s.
The NLRB will have to be expanded. Its procedures will be more complex.
One loophole looked as big as a mine shaft; refusal to work because of
"abnormally dangerous" conditions was not considered a strike. On June 30, John
L. Lewis might find something dangerous in every mine in the U.S.
To the lawyer's eye, there seemed to be many another loophole and many an
arguable provision in the Taft-Hartley Act, as there was in the Wagner Act.
Final interpretation will only come, as it did with the Wagner Act, after years
of litigation in the nation's courts.
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